A Study In Land 


Value | axation 


By LOUIS F. POST 





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A Study in Land Value Taxation 


By LOUIS F. POST. 
I, DEFINITION. 


The taxation of land values is identical with “the 
Singletax” as advocated by Henry George. 

It is a proposal to substitute land value taxation 
for all other methods of raising public revenues.' 


il, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, 


I. The Common Right to Land. 


The basic principle of this reform is the ethical 
theory that human rights to land are equal. 

No one can possess any better moral right to land 
than anyone else. He may, indeed, justly claim su- 
perior moral rights to landed improvements, such as 
buildings, clearings, fences, drainage, cultivation, or 
anything else that costs human labor. This he may do 
by virtue of his having made the improvements him- 
self, or honestly acquired them from whoever did 
make them. But the land—that is, the natural site of 
those improvements and the natural source whence 
their materials are drawn forth—to that he can have 
no exclusive moral right. It is the standing place and 
storeroom supplied by Nature for all living people; 
and each person must in justice be regarded as having 
an equal moral right with every other to its use. 

Escape from this conclusion is attempted some- 
times by a resort to prescriptive right, and sometimes 
by appeal to the doctrine of superior force. But neither 
can be of any avail.? 

1. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’ Book VIII, Chapter IV. See Post’s 
“The Taxation of Land Values,’ (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis), p. 1 and 


Note 2. Read “The Science of Political Economy,” Book II, Chapter IV. 
2. Read “The Land Question,”” Chapter VII. 


3 


Prescription is only a device for peace; if is not a 
principle of justice. By no possibility can it turn a 
wrong into a right. It can only suppress the asser- 
tion of rights. And though it may thus serve a useful 
purpose in preventing quarrels over rights that are 
ephemeral and obsolete, it becomes an engine of op- 
pression when it obstructs the assertion of rights 
that continually renew their vitality. 

Prescription cannot justly operate to deny to any 
newcomer into the world his equal right with all his 
contemporaries to be in the world.? The doctrine of 
superior force is self-destructive. If landowners may 
exclude the landless by superior force, then the land- 
less may, by the same right, exclude landowners. FEvi- 
dently, the right to land must have a firmer foundation 
than force—whether force of arms or force of laws. 

It must rest upon elementary principles of justice. 

Principles of justice require that the right to land 
shall be a common right. Though the use need not be 
common, the right must be. And it is because the 
right to land is in justice a common right, that values 
which attach to land may be justly taxed. The values 
of common rights are obviously common values.* 


Ul. The Individual Right to Labor Products. 


Correlative to the ethical principle that the right to 
land is a common right, is the other ethical principle 
that labor-products are the absolute private property 
of their producers. To deny the former principle is by 
implication to deny the latter.° 

This principle of the absolute property right of pro- 
ducers in their products is antithetical to the principle 
of slavery. It is deduced from the axiom that every 
man has, as against the claims of every other man and 
of all other men combined, a moral right to himself; 

8. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,” Book VIII, Chapter II. 

4. Read “Progress and Poverty,’? Book WII, Chapter I. Read ‘Pro- 
tection or Free Trade,’ Chapter XXVI, from the paragraph beginning: 
“Here are two simple principles,’’ to and including paragraph ending ‘‘is not 


the produce of labor.” 
Read ‘“‘The Taxation of Land Values,” p. 33, Note 81. 


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and its establishment as a principle of ethics is neces- 
sary to the ethical repudiation, not only of slavery 
but of all other forms of privilege, whether predatory 
or paternal. 

The principle is essential even to the idea of sacri- 
fice, as in charity; and of giving, as in communism. 
No one can sacrifice or give what is not first absolutely 
his own. 

There could not be any plausible objection to the 
principle of individual property in labor-products if 
every producer brought forth his own products alto- 
gether by his own individual labor. 

But in civilized production no producer brings forth 
any product in its entirety. So intense is the special- 
ization of industry that each contributor to any specific 
result contributes only an infinitesimal part of the total 
labor required. In doing so, he is indebted to preced- 
ing producers for his implements and materials to his 
associates as their joint work goes on, and to pro- 
ducers of even the dim past for the know-how. 

This complexity gives color to the theory that the 
results of production belong primarily and of moral 
right, not to individual producers, but to society as a 
whole. Society in the past, it is plausibly argued, has 
developed the existing methods and mechanism of pro- 
duction ; and society in the present makes their current 
use and their further development possible. Inasmuch 
then, as no individual can say of any complete pro- 
duct that he, or any one from whom he derives title, 
has produced it, the conclusion is urged that individual 
titles are not traceable to individual production. They 
are attributed rather to the activities of society as a 
whole. To society as a whole, therefore, it is insisted, 
the primary title belongs.® 

But that objection to the principle that individual 
property in labor products rests upon individual pro- 
duction is extremely superficial. 

6. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’’? Book I, Chapter I, from the para- 
graph beginning: ‘‘But the fundamental truth,’’ to the end of the chapter. 


Sarre ane Science of Political Economy,” Book III,» Chapters, IX, X 
an : 
5 


In moral and economic effect each individual does 
bring forth his own products in their entirety by his 
own individual labor. This would be obviously true 
in primitive conditions. It is equally true in those 
social conditions so familiar to this generation, in which 
industry is highly specialized. 


The proposition may be easily demonstisted 


If, in extremely primitive conditions, one man, aid- 
ed perhaps by such rude implements as sticks and 
stones fashioned wholly by himself, were to build a 
hut, that hut would clearly be his individual product. 
Morally, therefore, as against the demands of all other 
men, it would be his individual property. And being 
his individual property he would have the moral right 
to transfer it to another upon mutually satisfactory 
terms. In demanding terms he might be selfish. He - 
might demand such onerous terms as to be contempti- 
bly selfish. But if he did not resort to fraud or coer- 
cion, he would not be unjust. For his selfishness in 
this respect, though it deprived his brethren of com- 
forts, would not deprive them of rights. If, then, ex- 
ercising his right to trade the product of his labor for 
the product of another’s labor, he should trade the hut 
he had produced for another, similarly produced by 
another man, the hut he received in the trade would be 
his property in place of the one he had made. The 
one he had made would likewise be the property of 
his neighbor. Physically, indeed, neither man would 
have produced the particular hut now in his posses- 
sion; but inasmuch as each would have produced the 
one he traded for it, the net result would be the same 
as if he had physically produced his own. For all the 
purposes, then, of determining property rights ethical- 
ly, the title of each to the hut he possesses but did not 
make is as good as his title was before the trade to 
the one he has parted with but did make. The second 
is the expression of his labor as truly as was the first. 
In that sense, each man may be said to have produced 
the hut he possesses. 

Carrying the same principle farther, we find that 


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in conditions of diversified industry, the relation of in- 
dividual producers to completed products is exactly the 
same. 

One man might produce a house by himself digging 
the cellar, laying the foundation, erecting the super- 
structure, and inclosing and finishing it, while person- 
ally making all the tools. Though the result would 
doubtless be a poor apology for a house, one man 
could doubtless produce it without assistance of any 
kind, except as to the know-how. But he could much 
more easily produce a better house, if, cooperating 
with 100,000,000 men of like desires, he mingled his 
labor with theirs in the construction of 100,000,000 
houses—one for each of them and one for him. None 
of these cooperators would literally produce any of 
the houses entire. But each would contribute to the 
general productive processes. Some would help make 
machinery and others tools; some would help make 
designs ; some would assist in procuring material, while 
some helped to transport and others to shape it; some 
would dig cellars; some would erect one part of the 
superstructure and others other parts; and so on, 
through a labyrinth of specialized functions. And at 
the end, if each man in exchange for his contribution 
of specialized labor to the production of 99,999,999 of 
those houses, received from the others their contribu- 
tions of labor to the production of the remaining house, 
each would for all the purposes of determining ques- 
tions of individual title by the test of individual pro- 
duction, have been the producer in its entirety of the 
house he accepted in exchange. 

Highly specialized industry does not alter, it only 
obscures, the principle so obvious in more primitive 
conditions, that every laborer actually produces, to all 
moral and economic intents and purposes, the particu- 
lar product which he in free exchange accepts in lieu 
of his contribution of labor to the general processes of 
production.” 

7. Read “The Science of Political Economy,’? Book I, Chapters IT, 


III, IV, V. Study ‘Science of Political Economy,’’? Book I, Chapter VI. 
Read “Progress and Poverty,’”’ Book X, Chapter IT 


A 


Nor does he owe society any part of this share on 
account of his ability to produce in the modern way. 
Though society has indeed developed the methods 
which make highly specialized industry not only pos- 
sible but necessary, yet society does not endow him 
either with knowledge of these methods or with skill 
in using them. All that society can be said to do is to 
accumulate the knowledge, generation by generation. 
Kach producer must do the rest. By his own individual 
labor he must make that knowledge a part of himself 
before it can be serviceable through him in production. 
By study, his own study, he must individualize the 
knowledge; and by practice, his own practice, he must 
individualize the skill.® 


Society, therefore, has no claim to any share in 
an individual producer’s product (except as it secures 
him in the possession of superior locations), upon any 
plea that production is a social matter. So far as each 
man’s contribution to production goes, its direct re- 
sult, or what he receives in free exchange for that 
direct result, is, economically and morally, his own 
individual production, even to the know-how. 


Individuals are essentially the producers of such 
products as they demand and receive in free exchange 
for their individual contributions of labor to general 
production; and the products so received are as abso- 
lutely their private property as if they had actually 
made them.? 


II, CORRELATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES. 


The fundamental principles of the subject are thus 
seen to be twofold: (1) common rights to land; and 
(2) individual rights to products. 


These twofold rights are, as already stated, correl- 
ative—individual rights to labor products being de- 
8. Study “The Science of Political Economy,’’ Book III, Chapter XI. 
9. Study “Progress and Poverty,’’ Book VII, Chapter I, from para- 


graph beginning: ‘‘Second. This right of ownership,’ to paragraph ending, 
“natural reward of those who do.” 


8 


‘| 


pendent upon common rights to land. That this is 
true may be observed by considering the effect of 
private property in land upon the right of private 
property in labor products. The right of producers 
to their products is nullified in greater or less degree, 
by private property in land. For private property in 
land carries with it legal power to enforce the pay- 
ment of a premium for the use of land. It thereby 
enables landowners to exact labor-products from pro- 
ducers without themselves contributing to production. 
To that extent it is a practical denial of the right of 
producers to their products. 

It follows that individual rights of property in land 
must be abolished in order to secure to producers in- 
dividual rights of property in their labor-products.!° 

For the maintenance, then, not only of the ethical 
principle of common rights to land, but also of the 
ethical principle of individual rights to labor-products, 
common rights to land must in some way be secured. 
These correlative moral principles, in other words, 
must be mutually adjusted by law. 


IV. IDEAL ADJUSTMENT OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. 


The ideal adjustment of the principle of common 
rights to land and individual rights to labor-products 
is suggested by what to political economists is known 
as the law of rent. 

When, through individual appropriation, any kind 
of land becomes scarce relatively to the demand for it, 
the law of rent causes value to attach to that kind 
of land. In other words, scarce land commands a 
premium; whereas, plentiful land, if not arbitrarily 
inclosed, commands none. 

As different kinds of land become scarce, they 
command different premiums—some kinds more and 

10. Read “The Taxation of Land Values,’ from p. 34 to p. 88, and 
Notes 85, 87, 88, 93. Study “Progress and Povert'y,’? Book III, Chapter II. 
Read ‘‘Eighth Biennial Labor Report of Illinois,’ first edition, pp. 368-372; 


second edition, pp. 276-278—“Iconomic History of a Quarter Acre in 
Chicago.” 


some less, in proportion to the advantages they offer 
over the most desirable free land.11. The most desir- 
able free land is technically said to be at the “margin 
of cultivation,” or, more accurately—for the law of 
rent applies not only to agricultural lands but also 
to every other kind—at the “margin of production.” 
If producers used poorer land than that at the margin, 
they could not produce so much with the same effort. 
If they used better land, they would have to yield up 
the advantage in rent to its owner. 

This would be so, even if the producer himself were 
the owner. The value of the advantage would then 
come to him as omner in rent, and not as producer in 
earnings. 

The “margin of production,” therefore, determin- 
es on the one hand the rate of compensation to produc- 
ers everywhere, and regulates, on the other hand, the 
varying rent of scarce lands. Since rent, or periodical 
land premiums, must always leave to producers as 
much of their product as they could produce upon the 
best free land, the “margin of production” determines 
their compensation; but as they can retain of their 
products no more than they could produce upon free 
land, the remainder going as rent to the owner of the 
land they use, the “margin of production” regulates 
rent 

By taking advantage of this natural law, common 
property rights to land and individual property rights 
to labor-products may be secured. It is only neces- 
sary, without abrogating the individual possession of 
land which now obtains, to make a common fund of 
land values. 

Under that system, individuals would hold partic- 
ular parcels of land as now; they would use it individ- 

11. See “The Taxation of Land Values,” p. 86 and Note 89. 

12. Study “Progress and Poverty,’ Book III, Chapter I, and Book 
III, Chapter VI. Read ‘Progress and Poverty,’”? Book III, Chapter VIII, 
and the whole of Book IV. 

13. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’? Book VII, Chapters I and II. On 
the question of compensating land owners for their loss involved in abolish- 
ing the system (an important theoretical point in this connection), read 


“Progress and Poverty,” Book VII, Chapter III, and “Perplexed Philoso- 
pher,” Part III, Chapters X and XI. 


10 


ually as now; they would own the products they drew 
forth from it, as they do now. But at regular and 
frequent intervals each occupier would pay into a com- 
mon fund the rent of the particular parcel of land in 
his possession. Some occupiers would pay more and 
some less; but each would pay according to the ad- 
vantage offered by his parcel. 

Those who occupied land at or below the “margin 
of production” would contribute nothing to the com- 
mon fund, because they would enjoy no advantage. 
Since the supply of land like what they held would 
constantly and notoriously be in excess of the demand, 
nobody would pay a premium for theirs. Consequent- 
ly, the community could not, in justice, exact a prem- 
ium of them. All that they produced would be the 
result of their own individual labor. But those who 
occupied land of greater desirability than that at the 
“margin of production” would contribute the value oi 
their advantages—that is, the premiums which, under 
private ownership of land, they as owners might ap- 
propriate to themselves, or as tenants pay to a land- 
lord—to the common fund. If their holdings were only 
a little better than holdings at the “margin of produc- 
tion,” as is the case with village building lots and or- 
dinary farming land, the premiums would be low and 
their contributions small; but if their holdings were 
vastly better, as with rich mines and city building lots, 
the premiums would be high and their contributions 
large. None, therefore, would be deprived of any- 
thing due to his own contributions to production. For 
by securing anyone in the exclusive possession of es- 
pecially advantageous locations, society to that degree 
becomes in a sense his partner and acquires a right 
to share in his products to the extent of the value of 
that advantage. It is in this way, and only in this 
way, that society so assists individual producers as to 
be able to apply a just pecuniary measurement to its 
assistance. 

Society may claim this share upon still another 
theory. By securing to some the exclusive possession 


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of superior and scarce locations it deprives others of 
their equal right to land. In order, then, to maintain 
the equality of that right it is necessary that the 
value of the advantage—the value of the superior land 
—be taken by society for common use."* 


Products would thus fall into two categories. 


Into one would go enough products to represent 
the value of advantageous locations. This fund would 
be the common property of all, out of which common 
expenses would be paid. 

Into the other category would go all the products 
of individual producers, after advantages of location 
had been equalized by the withdrawal of products just- 
ly belonging to the common fund; and out of this sec- 
ond category, each producer would be paid in propor- 
tion to his individual production as determined by 
free competition. 

In other words, the former category would be made 
up of commonly earned “rent” and the latter of in- 
dividually earned “wages.” 

If this system were in ideally perfect operation, 
products to the exact value of each individual’s labor, 
i. e., what he could produce without the advantage 
over his fellows of superior location, would be reserved 
by him for his own use, and products to the exact 
value of land would be applied to the equal benefit of 
all. 


V. THE PRACTICAL ADJUSTMENT. 


But ideal perfection is not possible in anything. 
While it should always be our aim, we can expect to 
realize it only approximately. And a satisfactory ap- 
proximation to the distribution of labor-products in- 
to a common “rent” fund and an individual “wages” 
fund could doubtless be realized in general by carry- 
ing the Singletax ideal to the practical ultimate. 

There are instances, however, which may require 
PaaRead “Progress and Poverty,’? Book V, Chapter II. Study “The 
Taxation of Land Values,” pp. 36 to 51, both inclusive. Read ‘Social 


Problems,”? Chapters XVIII and XIX. Read ‘Protection or Free Trade,” 
Chapter XXV. 
12 


different treatment. It is possible that the adjustment 
of common and individual rights in connection with 
precious-metal mining could not be secured, even ap- 
proximately, by the taxation method. Should exper- 
ience demonstrate this, another method would be re- 
quired. It might be necessary in these cases to re- 
sort, for example, to renting, or even to governmental 
operation. But the ultimate decision of that question 
may safely be postponed until inadequacy of land value 
taxation in this respect shall have been demonstrated. 

So, also, it is possible that the taxation method may 
not be adequate in connection with such public utilities 
as railroads, street cars, and similar systems of public 
service. These systems use very valuable land. In- 
deed, the value of their franchises is altogether a land 
value. Whether land value taxation—or what is essen- 
tially the same thing, franchise value taxation—could 
be made to distinguish these land values with approx- 
imate certainty, only experience will tell. If it could 
not, then other means would have to be adopted. For 
land value taxation, aside from its revenue function, 
is only a fiscal means to a social end. The social end 
is the abolition of land monopoly and the securing to 
producers of individual property in their own products. 
Government ownership of public utilities, even their 
operation by government, is, therefore, not inconsist- 
ent with the fundamental principles of land value 
taxation, provided it be necessary on the one hand to 
the establishment of common rights to land, and on the 
other to the security of the laborer in the possession 
of what he earns. 

But in general, land value taxation would approx- 
imately realize its object. 

By far the most land, not only as to area but as to 
the much more important consideration of value, is 
of the kind which would be regulated justly in its ten- 
ure by full taxation of land values. As to most land, 
therefore, this method would be effectual. As to the 
rest, no peculiar method could be of general benefit 
if land values were not appropriated to common use. 


13 


If, for example, mining of the precious metals were 
made a governmental affair, and this method worked 
to perfection, the pecuniary benefits would be enjoyed, 
not by the public but by individuals whose farm land, 
or railroad land, or town lots were thereby enhanced 
in value. 

And so with public utilities. If railroading were 
successfully done by governmental agencies, the value 
of building lots, farm sites, and mineral deposits, with- 
in the influence of railroad benefits, would be so in- 
creased in value that their owners would appropriate in 
higher land premiums all the pecuniary advantages of 
the government railroad system. 

It is only by first appropriating to common use land 
values in general, which can be easily done by taxation, 
that a firm foundation for any other economic reform 
can be laid. 

That done, all other real reform would be econom- 
ically effective for the common good. But so long 
as that is left undone, all other reforms will be eco- 
nomically impotent. Instead of increasing the share 
of products that belongs to individual producers, they 
will but increase the share which goes to individual 
landowners.” 

For the practical adjustment, then, of common 
rights to land and individual rights to labor- -products, 
the primary method is taxation of land values. 


VI. THE SINGLE TAX ON LAND VALUES. 
I. Asa Fiscal Reform. 


This method consists in the abolition of all taxes, 
except such as are levied upon land-owners in pro- 
portion to the value of their land. 

As a revenue system it conforms most closely to 
the acknowledged principles of taxation. In the first 
place it would not check production. But it would 

15. On the subject of ‘indirect’? taxation, read ‘‘Protection or Free 
Trade,’’ Chapter VIII; ‘‘Progress and Poverty, > Book VIII, Chapter" iE; 
“Natural Taxation,” Chapter II; “The Eighth Biennial Labor pias of 


Tllinois,’”’ pp. 11, 12, 18. and “The Taxation of Land Values,” pp. 4, 5, and 
Note 12. 


14 


check monopoly; not only the minor monopolies that 
thrive upon indirect taxation,” but also the greatest 
of all monopolies and the fundamental one — land 
monopoly. In the second place the land value tax would 
be more easily and cheaply collected than any other 
form of tax. In the third place it would reduce fav- 
oritism to the minimum. Land value taxation affords 
least opportunity for partiality because unfairness in 
connection with levying it cannot be concealed. Of 
other taxes, few people in a community can tell wheth- 
er they are fairly levied or not; but about the fairness 
of land value taxation everybody would know. Ii 
there were but this one tax, public attention would be 
so concentrated upon its levy and collection that no 
substantially false assessments could be made without 
creating a public scandal. Secret under-valuations of 
any importance would be practically impossible. In 
the fourth place, and finally, the land value tax would 
be equal, in the only just fiscal sense of that term, 
which is equitable. No one would pay taxes unless he 
received public pecuniary advantages; and each one 
who did pay would do so in proportion to the pecuniary 
value of the advantages conferred by the public upon 
Bim2° 

To establish extensive taxation of land values, no 
violent revolution, no sudden or disturbing change 
of any kind, is required. 

We already tax land values to some extent. Noth- 
ing need be done, therefore, but to abolish all other 
taxes and allow the tax on land values to increase. 
And, however gradually that were done, the benefits 
of the reform would become manifest at the begin- 
ning, and grow more and more so as the abolition of 
other taxes proceeded and those upon land values 
were consequently augmented.” 

The most generally accepted method of introduc- 
ing this reform practically is by means of the prin- 

16. Study ‘Natural Taxation,’’ Chapters XI and XII. Study “Progress 
and Poverty,” Book VIII, Chapters III and IV. Also “Schilling’s Eighth 


Biennial Report of Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics,” pp. 14, 15 and 16. 
17. Read ‘Progress and Poverty,” Book VIII, Chapter II. 


15 


ciple of home government known as “local option” in 
taxation. Pursuant to that principle municipalities 
would receive authority from the legislature to raise 
their own proportion of public revenues, in their own 
chosen way—whether by the taxation of personal 
property, or of real estate, or of land values, or of all 
together. Having that authority the people of munici- 
palities could be directly appealed to, free from par- 
tisan influences and the complexities of a general tax- 
ation system, and solely upon the merits of the propo- 
sition, to adopt the Singletax among themselves. 


Local option in taxation is allowed in New Zealand, 
and the question of adopting it in this country has fre- 
quently been before State legislatures, beginning with 
the legislature of New York. Some legislatures 
have submitted the question to popular Referendum ; 
while in several States it has been submitted by Ini- 
tiative. The system was recommended in 1895, by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics of Illinois, in its eighth 
biennial report, along with forms for the necessary 
constitutional amendment and statute ;!8 and since that 
time it has been under frequent and extensive discus- 
sion. In Australia, as well as New Zealand, and in some 
of the Provinces of Canada it has been adopted for 
municipal purposes, although not to the extent of 
taking the entire value. 


II. Asa Social Reform. | 


The Single Tax would increase the production of 
wealth. 


First, by lifting the burden of taxation from pro- 
ducers as such, and thus stimulating production. The 
great bulk of taxes now rests as a burden upon pro- 
duction. This burden would be lifted. 

Second, by opening rich industrial opportunities 
now monopolized, and thereby enhancing productive 
power. 


_ 18. Read “The Eighth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics of Illinois,’’ p. 299. 
16 


a 


Valuable land could not be kept out of use under 
the Singletax.!® The distribution of wealth would 
thus be made equitable. With land monopoly destroy- 
ed, and taxes on production abolished, men would be 
free to produce in the most favorable conditions and to 
trade their labor and its products among themselves 
upon equal terms as bargainers. None would, there- 
fore, consent to take a oinaller share of wealth for 
his contribution of labor than his contribution of la- 
bor was worth. 


So, wages would rise to the point of earnings. 


The small home-owner would gain, because, though 
the value of his lot would disappear, its usefulness to 
him would remain, and his taxes on house, furniture 
and personal property would be abolished.*1 

But, except the mere laborer, farmers have most 
to gain by land value taxation.2? Every land-owner 
who is also a producer, would gain as producer, though 
he would lose as land-owner; and if his interests as 
producer were greater than his interests as land- 
owner, he would gain more than he would lose.”? 

Mere laborers would gain more than any other 
class. Having nothing to lose as landlords, their gains 
as laborers would have no offset.*4 

With the advent of the Singletax, most of the 
complexities and abuses of government as we know 
it, would disappear. For they are chiefly due to private 
land tenures and indirect taxation, which the Single- 
tax would abolish.”° 


And the simplification of government would make 


20 


19. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’ Book IX, Chapters I and II. 

20. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’? Book IX, Chapter IT. 

21. Read ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’’ Book IX, Chapter ITI. 

22. Study ‘‘Progress and Poverty,’’ Book IX, Chapter III, from the 
paragraph beginning: ‘‘And so with the farmer,”’ to the paragraph ending, 
“his gain would be real and great.’? Read ‘‘Social Problems,’ Chapters XX 
and XXI. 

oti Read “Progress and Poverty,’”? Book IX, Chapter I1I, four last para- 
graphs. 

24. Read “Progress and Poverty,’? Book IX, Chapter IV, paragraph 
beginning: ‘‘Give labor a free field.”” Read “Protection or Free Trade,” 
Chapter XXVIII. 

25. Read “Progress and Poverty,’’ Book IX, Chapter IV, first six 


paragraphs, 
if 


possible the assumption by it of new and beneficent 
functions.”® 


Greater than all else, the lust for gain would be 
displaced in individuals by ambition for noble service.?* 


26. Read “Progress and Poverty,’ Book IX, Chapter 1V, from para- 
graph beginning: ‘‘Society would thus,” to the paragraph ending, ‘‘Nothing 
could be further from the truth.” 

27. Read “Progress and Poverty,’’ Book IX, Chapter IV, from the 
paragraph beginning: ‘From whence springs this lust for gain,’”’ to the 
end of the chapter. 


18 


VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SUBJECT. 
I. Affirmative. 


The leading books in support of land value taxation 
are the works of Henry George. They are the fol- 
lowing: 

Our Land and Land Policy (1871). Progress and 
Poverty (1879). Social Problems (1883), Property in 
Land (1884). The Condition of Labor (1891). The 
Land Question (1881). Protection or Free Trade 
(1886). A Perplexed Philosopher (1892). The Science 
of Political Economy (1897). All published by Double- 
day & McClure, New York City. 


Pamphlets. 


The Singletax, What It Is and Why We Urge It. 
The Crime of Poverty. 
Thy Kingdom Come. 
Our Land and Land Policy. 
Moses. 
True Free Trade. 


In addition to George’s books, the following are re- 
ferred to in this “‘study:” 

“Natural Taxation; An Inquiry Into the Practica- 
bility, Justice and Effects of a Scientific and Natural 
Method of Taxation.” By Thomas G. Shearman. New 
York: Doubleday & McClure. 

“Eighth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics of Illinois. Subject: Taxation.” Spring- 
field, Ill. Prepared by Geo. A. Schilling, as secretary 
to the bureau. 

Taxation of Land Values. An explanation with il- 
lustrative charts, notes and answers to typical ques- 
tions of the land, labor and fiscal reform advocated by 
Henry George. By Louis F. Post. Indianapolis, Ind. 
Bobbs-Merrill Company. 

Other useful publications on the same side of the 
Subject*are: 


19 


“Current Objections to the Exaction of Economic 
Rent by Taxation Considered.” By Samuel B. Clarke 
of New York. A legal argument. 

“The Way Out.” By L. E. Wilmarth. A simple 
explanation for farmers. 

“The True Basis of Economics; or The Law of In- 
dependent and Collective Human Life,” being a cor- 
respondence between David Starr Jordan, president 
of the Leland Stanford, Jr., University, and Dr. J. H. 
Stallard of Menlo Park, Cal. 

“Land and the Community.” By S. W. Thackeray. 
New York: A. Appleton & Co. 

“Taxation.” -Byi Jz A.\Canheld, New, Yor waa gee 
Putnam’s Sons. 


Works of Louis F. Post. 


Taxation of Land Values. 

Trusts, Good and Bad. 

A Syllabus of Progress and Poverty. 
Ethics of Democracy. 

Social Service. 

Thou Shalt Not Steal. 

The Open Shop and the Closed Shop. 
Institutional Causes of Crime. 


General Matter. 


The Case Plainly Stated—H. F. Ring. 

Taxation of Land Values—Frederic C. Howe. 

Confessions of a Parasite—David Gibson. 

Crimes of the Minority—Alex Y. Scott. 

The True Social Remedy—George L. Record. 

The Land of Your Children—Emil Felden. 

Religion of Joseph Fels. 

The Lost Island—Austin & Sheldon. 

The Story of My Dictatorship—Lewis H. Berens 
and Ignatius Singer. 

The Shortest Road to the Single Tax. 

Natural Taxation—By Thos. G. Shearman. 


20 


Special Features. 


Public Sanitation and the Single Tax—Two Papers 
by Surgeon-General W. C. Gorgas and Prof. Lewis J. 
Johnson. 

A Broadened View of Efficiency—-Lewis J. Johnson. 

What’s the Matter With Business?—Henry H. 
Hardinge. 

Hard Times—James Pollak Kohler. 

How to Get Rich Without Working—Edward Ho- 
mer Bailey. 

‘Farmers Would Like It—Tom L. Johnson. 

Single Tax and the Farmer—Joseph Fels. 

A Merchant’s View of the Single Tax—Wm. F. 
Baxter. 

Smaller Profits, Reduced Salaries, and Lower 
Wages—George L. Rusby. 

Lessons of War. 

A Disregarded Warning. 

Disease of Charity—Bolton Hall. 

Intemperance—Bolton Hall. 

Canons of Taxation—Henry George. 

Taxation of Intangibles a Farce—Sam’] Milliken. 


Controversial. 


The Single Tax—F. W. Garrison. 

Professor Alvin Saunders—Johnson and The Single 
Tax—J. S. Codman. 

University Economics—Samuel Danziger. 

Teaching a “Professor of Economics” Political 
Economy—Daniel Kiefer. 

What Is It That Is Taught as Political Economy ?— 
Joseph Dana Miller. 


II. WNegative. 


“The Prophet of San Francisco.” An essay by the 
Duke of Argyll, published in George’s “Property in 
Land” (see above). 


fs) 


“Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII.” Published in 
George’s “Condition of Labor” (see above). 

“Essays in Taxation.” By Edwin R. A. Seligman. 
New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 

“Property and Progress.” By W. H. Mallock, New 
NOrk aca Pr eam Ss) syorLs. 

“Land and Its Rent.” By Francis A. Walker, Bos- 
ton: Little, Brown & Co. 

“Henry George’s Mistake About Land.” By W. T. 
Harris. Forum for July, 1887. Journal of Social 
Science, No. xxii, page 116. 

“Henry George vs. Henry George.” By R. C. Ruth- 
erford, New York: D. Appleton & Co. 

“Tenure and Toil.” By John Gibbons, Chicago: 
Law Journal Print. 

T. N. Carver—Essays in Social Justice. 

L. H. Haney—The Single Tax in Bulletin of the 
University of Texas, 1915. 

A. S. Johnson—The Case Against the Single Tax, 
Atlantic Monthly. 

Charles H. Shields—Single Tax Exposed. 


Ill. Miscellaneous. 


For an excellent history of the Single Tax move- 
ment see “The Single Tax Movement in the United 
States,” by Arthur Nichols Young, Ph. D. Princeton 
(N. J.) University Press and Oxford (England) Uni- 
versity Press. 

See also “Debate On the Single Tax, Affirmative, 
Negative, Rebuttal.” By Thomas B. Preston. Pub- 
lished by the New York State Single Tax League, 68 
William street, New York City. 


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